Unveiling Moscow's Military Transformation: Offensive Warfare Focus and Reinforcement of the Putin Regime

This reorganisation involves the establishment of two new military districts centred around Moscow and St. Petersburg, the creation of an Azov naval district, and the formation of two new joint forces along Russia's western border. These changes effectively discard the reforms implemented by Anatoly Serdyukov ten years ago, restoring the military organisation patterns from the Soviet era. As a result, Moscow now possesses the capability to conduct offensive warfare across a wide front, stretching from Finland to Moldova. Colonel-General Yevgeny Burdinsky, the deputy head of the Russian General Staff, provided detailed insights into these plans in the Defense Ministry journal, Voennyye komissariaty Rossii, building upon ideas originally presented by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in December 2022.

The Russian military leadership has harboured deep dissatisfaction with the reforms implemented by former Defense Minister Serdyukov. These reforms involved the elimination of the Moscow and Leningrad military districts, a shift towards regional structures, a reduction in the number of districts to four, a decrease in the number of tanks within Russian units, and a focus on defensive capabilities rather than offensive operations. These changes essentially reversed the doctrine and organisation established during the Soviet era. Given the challenges faced by the Russian military in Ukraine, the expansion of NATO to include Finland (which shares a border with Russia in the northwest), and the worsening relations between the Kremlin and Western countries, discussions within Moscow have increasingly revolved around the possibility of a broader conflict beyond Ukraine. These factors have provided an opportunity for Russian commanders to push for new reforms, resulting in the current changes being implemented.

Since the introduction of these reforms, the predominant focus of Russian discourse has been on the challenges faced by the Russian military under the Serdyukov-designed system, particularly in the context of the conflict in Ukraine. By attributing these problems to the former defence minister, commentators aim to shield Defense Minister Shoigu and President Vladimir Putin from criticism. However, an increasing number of voices are suggesting that the military redesign is actually a rational response to NATO's expansion and could potentially position Russia to engage in a war against what they perceive as an increasingly aggressive Western alliance. Some have gone as far as to propose that these new arrangements indicate Moscow's preparation for an offensive conflict.

While the articles mentioned above reflect the viewpoints of Putin's supporters and their stance on the war in Ukraine, an intriguing analysis of the reforms comes from Anatoly Nesmiyan, a Kremlin critic who operates under the pseudonym ‘El Murid’. In his commentary (Kasparov.ru, June 2), Nesmiyan makes two significant observations. Firstly, he acknowledges that the recent Russian actions are aimed at enhancing the combat capabilities of the military. However, he argues that implementing these changes during an ongoing war will be incredibly challenging and may hinder the Defense Ministry's objectives. According to El Murid, attempting to expand and reorganise the army simultaneously will impede the desired qualitative improvements in weaponry and command that are crucial for the Russian military. In essence, Nesmiyan suggests that while military reform is necessary, trying to undertake such reforms amidst a war is a recipe for disaster.

However, El Murid presents another intriguing perspective on these reforms. He suggests that the most significant aspect of the restructuring is not the establishment of new structures in Ukraine or along Russia's western border, but rather the reinstatement of two special military districts centred around the capitals, Moscow and St Petersburg. These districts were dissolved in 2010. According to El Murid, this indicates that a significant portion of resources will be directed towards these districts, potentially at the expense of other regions. He provocatively argues that this reflects the Kremlin's recognition that it may encounter difficulties in maintaining control over the entire country, and is thus preparing for scenarios of disintegration, or at the very least, rapid regionalisation and partial collapse along the periphery.