To Learn from Our Mistakes—Lessons from the 2025 Indo-Pakistan Conflict

When the Pahalgam massacre happened, we had a lot of voices calling for action against terrorism, especially Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Pakistan-sponsored terrorist group that has been wreaking havoc for so long in Kashmir, and indeed, all across India. The entire population talked about exacting revenge through direct action, and the Government clearly obliged them.

As Operation Sindoor took effect over the course of 7th May, there was euphoria among the public, with many cheering the action as the Government briefed the country. This is where one is led to really think and compare actions of a similar profile taken in the past by other nations such as Operation Neptune Spear by the US to take out Osama, and the stark difference becomes apparent: where counter-terrorist manoeuvres like these are usually taken in a silent, calm, solemn and professional manner, the media ops here seemed more like a Bollywood film with cheap graphics and flashy videos being released while social media handles, including some official ones, were issuing posts akin to those of the Afghan Army during the Fall of Kabul.

This clumsy management of the PR campaign was accompanied with absolutely no lobbying to the international community, no presentation of proof and no briefings about the action that had actually taken place while Pakistan stole a march here by sending its diplomats all across the globe to garner support— which it did with Azerbaijan and Turkey— and incorrectly projecting us as the aggressor. All this leads to portray as if our intention was more concerned with satisfying the local constituency and their bloodlust than actual military and geopolitical gains, any other explanation is defeated by the fact that the public simply does not need to be propagandised this much when it comes to a conflict with Pakistan, they are already convinced.

The material effect that this media mismanagement had, other than losing a good opportunity, was the fact that it led to an escalation which we were clearly not prepared to see through, as it turns out. One can excuse the fact that it’s a gamble in the first place and the myopia of our public in this sense is obvious since there is not such massive a gap between the capabilities of the two militaries in certain spheres despite the huge difference in defence budgets, but the real crux is to know the threshold and when to escalate, to strategically de-escalate and leverage our superiority that exists in many domains, including moral.

As the days progressed, many truths were revealed, such as the fact that the aircraft are, indeed, not infallible and the strength of our air defence systems with the S400 being vindicated. Among these skirmishes, arguably, could be many embarrassments, but a situation that eventually evolved into a place where India militarily very clearly had the upper hand. Right as India had its hand on the pulse and was pushing Pakistan into a position of negotiation, a ceasefire was brokered between the two sides. Political campists may view it a certain way, but it is obvious that this has been yet another addition to a series of ambiguous outcomes. With no concrete security guarantees for India, dozens of dead people, an IMF bailout for Pakistan (although that was in the pipeline for a very long time) and a PR victory for Trumpists and the USA, India has walked out blushing for the umpteenth time. Of course, in conflicts and evolving geopolitical situations, the outcome remains unpredictable and cannot always be controlled, but certain stimuli are in our hands, and we must ensure that we cover up our gaps for the future.

After the Prime Minister’s strong speech signalling a return to normalcy and an operational success, and rightly so, what might follow, despite the posturing and brinkmanship on media, is a return to the cycle of violence, regular violations of the ceasefire, a resumption of domestic politics in India and many deluding themselves by looking at this as a clear victory, perhaps with the satisfaction of the equivalence having been made between terrorist attacks and acts of war, something which did not require any geopolitical capital in the first place and a condition that seems really impractical to fulfill altogether. One is left to struggle to wonder in this fog of war as to which among the many steps did we truly miss the opportunity to take full advantage. If we are willing to analyse dispassionately with moral courage, maybe we will learn our lessons well and leverage better in the times to come.


Sohraab Singh is a high school student from Chandigarh observing geopolitical, military and domestic affairs. An avid reader, he also has an interest in matters relating to national security and political violence.